Charles M. Cork, III has written over seventy appellate briefs in a variety of fields of law, on several occasions as amicus curiae. The briefs covered significant issues of public policy as well as the more typical applications of law to the case.

Torts and Tort Reform

  • Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997) (reversing the Court of Appeals effectively overruling scores of decisions of the Court of Appeals, and making slip-and-fall premises liability cases viable; in addition, I successfully asked that the Supreme Court go beyond the issue on which certiorari was granted to address other problematic issues in this field of law).
  • Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376; 667 S.E.2d 366 (2008), affirming 288 Ga. App. 875, 655 S.E.2d 662 (2007) (whole court) (authorizing suit for the metastasis of a cancer that the defendant doctors failed to diagnose more than two years earlier, upholding the "new injury" concept, against objections that individual had symptoms of cancer more than two years before the discovery of the cancer)
  • EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333, 626 S.E.2d 482 (2006) (striking down part of the tort reform statute that allowed a medical malpractice defendant to transfer venue to the county in which the tort occurred automatically)
  • R.J. Taylor Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Beck, 280 Ga. 660, 631 S.E.2d 684 (2006) (requiring defendants seeking a change of venue under OCGA 9-10-31.1 to make an evidentiary showing, holding that mere numbers of witnesses in the respective counties does not suffice).
  • Thompson v. Thompson, 278 Ga. 752 (2004) (reversing the Court of Appeals and rejecting the part of the proximate cause charge in the prior Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions using the phrase “dominant cause”).
  • Beach v. Lipham, 276 Ga. 302, 578 S.E.2d 402 (2003) (qualifying the use of the standard “presumption of due care” charge in medical malpractice cases to avoid some misleading implications about the evidence and the burden of proof).
  • Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital Management, Inc., 305 Ga. App. 283 (2010) (reversing dismissal of case against numerous nonresident defendants for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of conspiracy among them, along with resident defendants, to defraud Texas corporation).
  • Duren v. Paccar, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 758, 549 S.E.2d 755 (2001) (ruling that federal regulations concerning anti-lock breaking systems do not preempt Georgia’s product liability law).
  • Wesleyan College v. Weber, 238 Ga. App. 90, 517 S.E.2d 813 (1999) (reversing the grant of a new trial, upholding a verdict, and establishing the liability of owners of trees near roadways for failing to inspect trees from all sides, not just the roadway side).
  • Kissun v. Humana, Inc., 267 Ga. 419, 479 S.E.2d 751 (1997) (reversing a Court of Appeals decision that would have exempted parent corporations from liability under the doctrines of apparent agency and joint venture).


  • BlueCross BlueShield of South Carolina v. Carillo, 372 F.Supp.2d 628 (N.D.Ga. 2005) (holding that ERISA does not allow plans to seek reimbursement as "appropriate equitable relief"), affirmed after Sereboff in Popowski v. Parrott, 461 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that BCBS's claim was properly dismissed because the plan's language did not seek a specific fund of money, but instead sought a level of reimbursement that could be much higher than settlement proceeds). A report on the oral argument is here.
  • Davis v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Georgia, Inc., 271 Ga. 508, 521 S.E.2d 815 (1999) (reversing the Court of Appeals and establishing that, where the tort recoveries are insufficient to make the victim whole and reimburse the victim’s health insurer, the public policy of Georgia in favor of complete compensation for insured victims is paramount over express terms in a policy that would give priority to the insurer’s reimbursement claim, even before the 1997 statute that regulated the field).
  • Gordon v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 279 Ga. 148, 611 S.E.2d 24 (2005) (construing the uninsured motorist statute to mandate coverage for the deaths of "persons," not just "insureds," for which the policyholder has a right to recover).
  • Reid v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 223 Ga. App. 204, 477 S.E.2d 369 (1996), affirmed 268 Ga. 432, 491 S.E.2d 50 (1997) (allowing a plaintiff to cure the failure to serve an uninsured motorist carrier within the time provided by law -- in this case because the liability carrier became insolvent after the statute of limitation expired -- by dismissing and refiling the suit under Georgia’s renewal statute, thus freeing plaintiffs from serving the uninsured motorist carriers in every case; the problem was later legislatively solved).
  • White v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 266 Ga. 371, 467 S.E.2d 332 (1996) (reversing a Court of Appeals decision that would allow insurers to circumvent the statutory policy permitting “stacking” of uninsured motorist policies).

Condemnation and Real Property

  • Harper Investments, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 251 Ga. App. 521, 554 S.E.2d 619 (2001) (establishing that rights of access to property survive in spite of the enactment of commercial driveway regulations and arguably restrictive “temporary” right-of-way deeds).
  • Hillman v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 338, 359 S.E.2d 637 (1987) (rejecting a trend in Court of Appeals decisions that prohibited a land owner from recovering damages to the remaining property caused by the taking of a temporary construction easement).
  • Hall v. Christian Church of Georgia, 280 Ga. App. 721, 634 S.E.2d 793 (2006) (setting aside an award of over $28,000 in damages under OCGA 9-15-14, the frivolous litigation statute, in a land line dispute).